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Abstract
This paper surveys recent advances in empirical studies of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism (MTM), with special attention to Central and Eastern Europe.
In particular, while laying out the functioning of the separate channels in the MTM,
it explores possible interrelations between different channels and their impact on
prices and the real economy. The empirical ￿ndings for Central and Eastern Eu-
rope are then brie￿y compared with results for industrialized countries, especially
for the euro area. We highlight potential pitfalls in the literature and assess the rel-
ative importance, and potential development, of the different channels, emphasizing
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11 Introduction
Given its potential to affect the real economy, monetary policy has been subject to intense acad-
emic scrutiny over the years in the economics profession. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) deem the
mechanism through which monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real economy a black
box. Interest in resolving this conundrum has given rise to a large body of theoretical literature
and to a plethora of empirical papers that seek to match theory with real data. The most traditional
explanation for the link is the interest rate channel developed in textbook IS-LM models. How-
ever, the early observation that the interest rate channel cannot neatly explain output ￿uctuations
has given birth to the credit channel literature (including the bank lending, the broad lending, the
bank capital channel and the role of trade credit). Finally, asset prices, such as the exchange rate,
stock and real estate prices, are also believed to constitute a bridge between nominal and real vari-
ables, which has had important policy implications for the choice of variables in a central bank’s
interest rate rule when a central bank targets in￿ation. This paper analyzes the separate functioning
of the distinct channels, but it also highlights possible interlinkages between the different channels
through which they may magnify or counteract each others’ in￿uence in the monetary transmission
mechanism (MTM).
There are at least two important reasons to study the monetary transmission mechanism in
the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). First, a genuine and precise under-
standing of how fast, and to what extent, a change in the central bank’s interest instrument modi￿es
in￿ation lies at the heart of in￿ation targeting. An increasing number of transition countries are
already making use of in￿ation targeting or are planning to do so. Second, given the forthcoming
full euro area participation of the countries that entered the EU in May 2004 and given the large
gap in ￿nancial sector development between CEE and the euro area, it is of fundamental impor-
tance to evaluate whether monetary transmission operates differently in CEE countries. Indeed, a
homogeneous approach to monetary policy for CEE and euro area countries could lead to sharply
different effects on the economies and what kind of new challenges the ECB will be facing in this
2context.
Despite the importance of these questions, the empirical literature dealing with CEE appears to
be fragmented. This paper attempts to bring together different branches of the literature. In par-
ticular, we take stock of the empirical studies relating to CEE and present them systematically. In
addition, we direct attention to potential pitfalls in the literature and assess the relative importance
and the potential development of the different channels.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 to 5 survey the theoretical literature and summa-
rize the empirical ￿ndings for the CEE transition economies for the interest channel, the exchange
rate channel, the asset price channel and the credit channel, respectively. Section 6 analyzes stud-
ies based on the vector autoregression (VAR) methodology. Section 7 concludes by speculating on
possible future developments of the different channels.
2 The Interest Rate Channel and the Transmission Process
The interest rate channel encapsulated in the traditional IS-LM model can be dissected into two
distinct stages: (1) the transmission from short-term nominalinterest rates to long-term real interest
rates, and (2) the channel through which aggregate demand and production are affected by real
interest rate developments.
2.1 First Stage: Interest Rate Pass-Through
2.1.1 Theoretical Aspects
Crucial to the effectiveness of any monetary policy action is ￿rst, how changes in the monetary pol-
icy rate are transmitted onto market rates at the longer end of the maturity spectrum, and, second,
how bank deposit and lending rates are affected by such a change in market rates.
The term structure of interest rates provides the connection between short- and long-term (mar-
ket) nominal interest rates. The slope and the dynamics of the term structure can best be ex-
plained using a combination of standard theories, such as the liquidity preference view, according
3to which investors require a liquidity premium for holding less liquid (usually long-term) assets,
or the market segmentation view, according to which short-term and long-term interest rates can
be determined independently in segmented markets. More importantly, it is widely accepted that
expectations are a key determinant of the shape of the yield curve. According to this view, long-
term interest rates are obtained as an average of expected future short-term interest rates. This is
often referred to as the expectation channel, which also plays an important role in the asset price
and exchange rate channels.
Another facet of transmission is how interest rates in the money and capital markets in￿uence
bank deposit and loan interest rates. We can illustrate the connection between market rates and
bank lending using a marginal cost pricing model, where the price set by the bank ( iB) equals the
marginal cost of funding approximated by a market interest rate iMand a constant markup ￿ (De
Bondt, 2002):
i
B = ￿ + ￿ ￿ i
M (1)
The pass-through parameter ￿ is equal to 1 under perfect competition and complete informa-
tion. However, full (or perfect or complete) pass-through may not prevail if markets are imperfect
and information is asymmetric. In particular, the degree of pass-through crucially hinges on the
presence of a unit interest rate elasticity of demand for both deposits and loans. Demand elastic-
ities lower than one result in an incomplete pass-through ( ￿ < 1), and a combination of factors
may cause the demand elasticities to become less than unity. First, imperfect substitution between
bank deposits and other investment facilities of the same maturity and ￿exibility (money market
funds, T-bills and the like), and between bank lending and other types of external ￿nance (eq-
uity or bond markets), reduces demand elasticities: a low degree of competition between banks,
and between banks and nonbank ￿nancial intermediaries, lowers the sensitivity of demand for de-
posits and loans to the interest rate. Second, demand elasticities may be reduced if it is costly to
change banks (switching costs). In addition, market segmentation due to switching costs and a
4high concentration of the banking sector can lead to a monopolistic market structure, preventing
the pass-through from being unity.
The presence of asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) may render bank
lending rates less responsive to changes in the key rate. At the same time, the interest rate pass-
throughtolendingratescanexceedone(overshooting)intheeventthatbankschargehigherinterest
rates in an attempt to counteract higher risks resulting from asymmetric information, rather than
reducing the supply of loans (De Bondt, 2002).
If competition is weak, the interest rate pass-through may vary over the interest rate cycle.
When interest rates are on the rise, banks may adjust their lending rates more quickly than their
deposit rates. Conversely, if interest rates are falling, they may tend to decrease their deposit rates
more rapidly than their lending rates (Hannan and Berger, 1992, and Weth, 2002). Sander and
Kleimeier (2004a) stress that the degree of competition is more important for the pass-through for
deposit rates than for lending rates, since problems related to asymmetric information are smaller
for deposit rates.
Furthermore, the pass-through from the policy rate to retail rates may not only be incomplete in
the long run, but could be sluggish in the short run due to an array of factors: First, banks respond
slowly to changes in market rates in the presence of adjustment or menu costs. They may decide
to adjust lending rates less frequently than policy rates are changed, but when they do adjust, the
movement is substantial. Second, the way in which banks adjust their lending rates depends on
the maturity mismatch of their loan and deposit portfolio. The more long-run loans are covered
by long-term deposits, the less pressure banks feel to adjust their lending rates. In other words,
it matters how responsive their liability side is to market rates. Banks with extensive recourse to
long-run deposits such as saving deposits, which are not particularly affected by market rates, are
slower to adjust their lending rates than banks whose liability side relies more heavily on deposits
or other forms of ￿nancing, which are more sensitive to market rates (Weth, 2002).
Third, if banks have long-term relationships with their customers, they may want to smooth
5interest rate changes. This may apply to universal banks and the so-called ￿hausbank.￿
Finally, macroeconomic conditions may also affect the pass-through. During periods of rapid
economic growth, i.e. under favorable economic conditions, banks may ￿nd it easier to pass on
changes in the interest rate to their lending and deposit rates more quickly. Higher in￿ation may
alsofavoramorerapidinterestratepass-through, giventhatpricesmaybeadjustedmorefrequently
in a high-in￿ation than in a low-in￿ation regime. Increased uncertainty as re￿ected in higher
interest rate volatility may, however, lower the interest rate pass-through, because banks may want
to get a true picture of the underlying position.
Importantly, the pass-through to loan rates is intimately related to the credit market in general
and to the functioning of the credit channel in particular. As we will argue later in the paper,
disequilibrium in the credit market may either diminish the completeness of the pass-through or
may help in moving toward full pass-through. A related issue is how easily banks can re￿nance
themselves. Banks which have more dif￿culty accessing external ￿nancing because of asymmetric
information problems ￿ usually smaller banks ￿ increase their deposit rates to attract more de-
posits, and, consequently, also adjust their lending rates. By the same token, more liquid and more
capitalized banks adapt their retail rates more slowly to changes in the monetary policy rate than
less liquid banks with less capital (Gambacorta, 2004).
2.1.2 Empirical Issues and Results
There are three main strands in the literature relating to the choice of the explanatory interest rate
variable. One strand tests how market interest rates are transmitted to retail bank interest rates
of comparable maturity. This approach is termed the cost of funds approach (De Bondt, 2002).
A second strand directly tests the impact on retail rates of changes in the interest rate controlled
by monetary policy. Sander and Kleimeier (2004a) call this as the monetary policy approach.
In practice, the interest rate pass-through is usually investigated using an error correction model
(ECM) including two interest rate series which may or may not include size or sign asymmetry.
Size asymmetry occurs when the speed of adjustment to equilibrium depends on the size of the
6deviation: the higher the deviation from equilibrium the quicker the adjustment. Sign asymmetry
occurs when the speed of adjustment differs depending on whether the deviation occurs above or
below equilibrium or whether the policy rate declines or increases.
A third unifying approach includes two stages (see chart 1):
1.) the pass-through from the monetary policy rate to market rates (iMP ! iM)
2.) the transmission from market rates to retail rates (iM ! iB)
These two stages can be incorporated into an ECM representation as in equation (2) (Berstein
and Fuentes, 2003, and De Bondt et al., 2003):
￿i
B
t = ￿0 + ￿(i
B
t￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i
M
t￿1 ￿ ￿i
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l X
j=1
￿j￿i
B
t￿j + ￿t (2)
However, the interpretation of a single-equation setting becomes dif￿cult when the series are
found to be cointegrated. In this kind of setup it is probably best to test separately for the existence
of two potential cointegration relationships (iMP ! iM;iM ! iB) using the methods of Johansen.
Chart 1. The Transmission between Interest Rates
    first stage
second stage
monetary policy approach cost of funds approach
Monetary policy rate (
MP i ) Longer-term market rates (
M i )
Retail rates (
B i )
One dif￿culty with the transmission between interest rates is that the ￿rst stage relating mone-
tary policy rates and longer-term market rates inherently measures the term structure, which cru-
cially hinges on how expectations are formed about future in￿ation and the reaction of mone-
tary policy to in￿ation. Consequently, the term structure may change over time and may differ
between countries. For a given country, changes in the term structure may indicate changes in
in￿ation expectations or the progress of disin￿ation. Across countries, differences in the term
7structure may stem from the heterogeneity of views about the credibility of monetary policy or of
weights/preferences given to ￿ghting in￿ation (the tradeoff between in￿ation and output stabiliza-
tion).
Table 1 summarizes the empirical studies carried out for transition economies. Although the
country coverage is unbalanced and the quality of the data may be of some concern in some cases,
some general conclusions can be drawn. First, it appears that the pass-through from the monetary
policy key rate to short-term money market rates is very high or complete. The pass-through from
money market rates to market interest rates of shorter maturity also turns out to be very high,
whereas the pass-through to long-term market rates is unstable mainly because of the change in the
yield curve resulting from successful disin￿ationary policies. This implies that the pass-through
from the policy rate to retail rates occurs via short-term rather than long-term market rates.
Most studies use the one-stage monetary policy approach to estimate the pass-through from
market to retail interest rates. Three main results stand out, and they turn out to be similar to the
￿ndings for the euro area.
1.) The most complete pass-through is typically found for short-term corporate lending rates
followed by long-term corporate loan rates. The lowest average pass-through is observed for con-
sumer loans.
The pass-through tends to be higher for the Baltic states and particularly low for the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia. For Hungary and Poland, the range is rather large. In general, except for
Romania, the interest rate charged for new loans tends to react more strongly to market conditions
than that for old loans.
2.) The pass-through to deposit rates is less complete, the average long-run pass-through coef￿-
cient amounting to 0.72 for short-term deposits and to 0.69 for long-term deposits. In particular, it
appears that the remuneration of current accounts and saving accounts incorporates a very low frac-
tion of changes in market rates. However, the pass-through of time deposits increases for higher
maturities.
8Another, and perhaps surprising, observation is that there is no systematic difference between
the long-run pass-through for interest rates on household and corporate deposits for Hungary and
Poland. By contrast, changes in market rates are transmitted much less into corporate than into
household deposit rates in Estonia and Latvia.
3.) There is substantial cross-country heterogeneity for the long-run pass-through.
1 Moreover,
there is heterogeneity even for the same market in the same country.
Consider, for example, mortgage rates for Lithuania, where the pass-through is complete for
one-year rates and is nearly zero for ￿ve-year rates. Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) provide some
quantitative support for this view by regressing the estimated pass-through coef￿cients on country
and market dummies (for loans and deposits). The country dummies turn out to be signi￿cant. The
market dummies con￿rm that the pass-through for short-term and long-term loan rates is higher
and their reaction is swifter, especially when compared to saving and current accounts. They also
￿nd that the long-run pass-through for corporate loans is quite homogeneous, even though there are
differences in the speed of adjustment. ￿gert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2006) provide evi-
dence of large heterogeneity across countries and market segments. They also show that a number
of time series for which error correction models are estimated in the literature are not cointegrated.
The regressions run for ￿rst-differenced data indicate lower pass-through coef￿cients.
A major difference between CEECs and the euro area countries is the weaker evidence in favor
of asymmetry in the adjustment process. Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) conclude that the pass-
through process exhibits less asymmetry in the transition economies. This statement is backed
by results reported in Crespo-Cuaresma, ￿gert and Reininger (2004) and Chmielewski (2003).
Nonetheless, Opiela (1999) ￿nds some asymmetries for Polish bank level data from 1994 to 1998,
and HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2004) for Hungarian deposit and loan rates for a more recent
period. ￿gert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2006) ￿nd an increase in asymmetry over time
1 Itisnotalwaysclearwhethertheinterestrateseriesusedundertheheading￿long-runinterestrates￿are￿xedorvariableratesfor
long-run loans or deposits. However, the results indicate how any given composition reacts to changes in the base or market rates.
9even though the share remains low and no clear pattern seems to emerge with regard to any speci￿c
country or interest rate series.
Another interesting ￿nding on the pass-through in CEE is that both the contemporaneous and
long-run pass-through increase over time, while the mean adjustment lag to full pass-through de-
creases, as more recent data can be used (Crespo-Cuaresma, ￿gert and Reininger, 2004; HorvÆth,
Krek￿ and Nasz￿di, 2004; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004b).
2 However, ￿gert, Crespo-Cuaresma and
Reininger (2006) show that the pass-through has been slowing down in the CEE-5
3 in the past few
years.
Table 1 Long-Run Interest Rate Pass-Through Estimates for the CEECs
Type of rate Average long-run pass-through
Money market rate 1.01
Short-term deposit rate 0.72
Long-term deposit ate 0.69
Short-term lending rate 1.01
Long-term lending rate 0.91
Consumer lending rate 0.51
Housing/mortgage lending rate 0.73
Goverment security yields 0.92
Note: Averages are obtained using estimates reported in `rvai (1998), Crespo-Cuaresma, ￿gert and Reininger (2004),
HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2004), Nickisch (2005), Sander and Kleimeier (2004b), Tieman (2004),VÆrhegyi (2003) and
Wr￿bel and Pawlowska (2002)
2.1.3 Main Determinants of the Interest Rate Pass-Through in CEE
A number of researchers have attempted to identify the factors affecting the size and speed of the
pass-through. They have taken three approaches: The ￿rst consists of estimating a time series pass-
through equation by including variables like market concentration (as a measure for competition).
Forexample, Wr￿belandPawlowska(2002)thatinPolandanincreaseinconcentration￿measured
by the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index
4 ￿ reduces the pass-through for lending rates (as expected)
2 VilÆgi and Vincze (1998) report very sluggish short-run adjustment and very low (0.1) long-run pass-through from 30-day
and 90-day T-bill rates toward rates on new corporate loans and short-term corporate deposits for Hungary between 1991 and 1994.
3 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
4 Alternatively, market concentration could also be measured as the share of the three or ￿ve biggest banks in terms of loans
10but increases it for deposit rates. Kot (2004) employs a different measure for competition. He
argues that if competition is strong (that is, banks are price takers), the interest rate elasticity of the
demand for products of individual banks ( ￿ID
i ) is much larger than the interest rate elasticity of
aggregate demand for bank products ( ￿AD
i ). Hence, ￿ID
i > ￿AD
i . Conversely, if banks have market
power and can therefore in￿uence interest rates, the interest rate elasticity at the individual and
at the aggregate level will be closer to one another. The empirical assessment of the elasticities
shows that consumer credit markets are more competitive in Hungary and in Poland than those in
the euro area and that the degree of competition is the lowest in the Czech Republic. A second
group of papers exploits the cross-sectional dimension of the data by ￿rst estimating pass-through
coef￿cients using time series for an array of countries and markets and then by regressing the
coef￿cients on a number of explanatory variables, such as macroeconomic variables and variables
related to the structure of the ￿nancial sector. Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) adopt this approach.
Their results indicate that of the macroeconomic variables, GDP growth and ￿nancial depth do
not affect the speed and the size of the pass-through, while higher in￿ation is associated with a
more pronounced pass-through and money market volatility decreases the pass-through.
5 Of the
variables measuring the structural features of the ￿nancial sectors, a lower degree of concentration,
fewer bad loans (a healthier banking sector) and more foreign participation tend to be associated
with a higher and faster pass-through. This result holds for loans as well as for deposits.
The above approach can be extended to bank-level data. In such a setting, pass-through coef-
￿cients are estimated for individual banks and in the second stage are regressed on bank-speci￿c
features. Opiela (1999) uses this option and shows that for the period from 1994 to 1998, the pass-
through of 37 Polish banks depends on ownership (involvement of the state), the share of bad loans
and the degree of capitalization. In particular, he demonstrates that interest rates of state-owned
banks respond strongly when interest rates fall; as these are banks loaded with bad loans, they
or deposits in total loans or deposits.
5 This contrasts with HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2004), who ￿nd that higher money market volatility increases the speed
of adjustment.
11pass on changes in market conditions to retail interest rates more quickly during periods of rising
interest rates.
A third way of proceeding involves combining time series and the cross-sectional dimension of
bank-level data. More precisely, the reaction of the interest rates of individual banks to monetary
policy steps and how these steps interact with bank-speci￿c characteristics are investigated in a
panel setting.
HorvÆth et al. (2004) investigate whether the interest rate pass-through is heterogeneous for 25
Hungarian banks and ￿nd that the pass-through was homogeneous for corporate loan and deposit
rates for the period from 2001 to 2004. VÆrhegyi (2003) examines the interest rate pass-through
from money market rates to household deposit rates for a similar dataset (11 Hungarian banks) and
sample period (2000 to 2003). While the pass-through is incomplete in the long run for all banks,
some heterogeneity is uncovered for individual banks.
Chmielewski (2003) goes a step beyond studying the pass-through at the bank level and esti-
mates the pass-through for two groups of Polish banks as a function of whether they are good or
bad in terms of (1) the share of classi￿ed loans, (2) the capital adequacy ratio, and (3) pro￿tability
captured by the return on assets. Perhaps, not surprisingly, more pro￿table banks adjust household
deposit rates for longer maturities and for corporate loan rates faster than less pro￿table banks.
Also, banks with more bad loans are quicker in adjusting their lending rates and slower in doing so
for deposit rate. Finally, better capitalized banks turn out to react less quickly to market conditions
than less capitalized banks.
To summarize, higher concentration of the banking sector, higher pro￿tability and higher cap-
italization of banks typically make banks less receptive to adjusting their retail rates to market or
policy rates, and hence dampen the interest rate pass-through. However, this general ￿nding is in
con￿ict with the result that the ownership structure, especially the involvement of foreigners in the
banking sector, may enhance the interest rate pass-through, given that more foreign participation
leads to higher concentration and that foreign-owned banks tend to be more pro￿table and better
12capitalized.
2.2 Second Stage: The Monetary Channel
While the ￿rst stage of monetary transmission concerns interest rate interactions, the second stage
relates to the impact of nominal interest rate changes on the real sector. Price stickiness and rational
expectations ensure that an innovation in short-term nominal interest rates will lead to moves in
both short-term and long-term real interest rates. Given that real interest rate movements re￿ect
changes in the cost of capital and corporate investment, spending will be affected. Like investment
decisions, spending on housing and durable goods is sensitive to real interest rates. Of course,
changes in interest rates entail two con￿icting effects. A rise in interest rates increases the income
of holders of interest-bearing assets (income effect), which can be offset by higher interest rates
favoring savings instead of consumption (substitution effect). Changes in investment, housing and
durable goods spending, i.e. aggregate demand, will eventually cause changes in output.
A few recent empirical studies investigate this issue. One of them is Chatelain et al. (2001), who
estimate the sensitivity of manufacturing ￿rms’ investment demand to changes in the user cost of
capital (and in sales and cash ￿ow). The empirical evidence based on large micro-panels indicates
that investment demand in France, Germany, Italy and Spain is sensitive to the user cost of capital.
This is evidence that the money channel is at work in these countries. Similar results are reported in
KÆtay and Wolf (2004) for the case of Hungary. Kiss and Vadas (2005) investigate the Hungarian
mortgage market and show that changes in mortgage interest rates have only a limited in￿uence on
disposable income (income effect), mainly because of institutional factors (the government subsidy
scheme and the domination of ￿xed noncallable mortgages).
3
134 Exchange Rate Channel
Beside interest rates and asset prices, both nominal and real exchange rates play a prominent role
in the monetary transmission mechanism. Monetary policy is able to bring about changes in the
level of the exchange rate and thus to provoke changes in (1) prices, (2) trade volumes and (3)
investment.
4.1 Monetary Policy Actions and the Exchange Rate
4.1.1 Short-Term Interest Rates and the Exchange Rate
An increasing number of papers have used the VAR methodology to study the impact of monetary
policy innovations on the most important macroeconomic variables. These papers are surveyed
in more detail below; they also address the impact of shocks in short-term interest rates on the
nominal exchange rate and produce mixed results, since positive interest rate shocks can lead to an
appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate. The latter phenomenon is usually referred to as
the exchange rate puzzle, which under special circumstances can be attributed to the unsuccessful
defense of a given exchange rate level.
Relying on a different methodological framework, Rezessy (2004) shows that for Hungary
changes in the key policy rate led to systematic changes in the exchange rate. He reports the
absence of an exchange rate puzzle, since a rise in the policy rate causes the exchange rate to
appreciate.
4.1.2 Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market
In addition to changes in the short-term interest rate, monetary authorities may also in￿uence short-
run exchange rate movements by directly intervening on the foreign exchange markets. Although it
is widely acknowledged that unsterilized intervention affects the exchange rate by altering relative
money supply, the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of sterilized intervention, which may
work through the portfolio, the signaling and the microstructure (or coordination) channels, is
14fairly mixed.
Theviewthatforeignexchangeinterventionmaybemoreeffectiveinemergingmarketeconomies
than in well established industrialized countries is gaining acceptance; the main arguments sup-
porting this view is that in emerging markets (1) central bank interventions are not always fully
sterilized, (2) the size of interventions is large relative to market turnover in narrow foreign ex-
change markets, (3) market organization and the regulatory framework may be more conducive
to interventions, (4) moral suasion may play a bigger role, and (5) central banks have a greater
informational advantage over market participants (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003).
Onlyafewpapersstudytheeffectivenessofforeignexchangeinterventionintransitioneconomies
using daily data.
6 Disyatat and Galati (2005) could not ￿nd any signi￿cant impact of daily foreign
exchange interventions on the exchange rate of the Czech koruna using daily data from 2001 to
2002. By contrast, they ￿nd that interventions tend to increase foreign exchange volatility.
However, Holub (2004) applies an event study approach to monthly data and shows that inter-
vention tends to be effective and, on a number of occasions, consistent with in￿ation targeting.
Also relying on the event study approach ￿ but applied to daily data and completed with Gener-
alized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) estimations ￿ ￿gert and Komarek
(2005) provide some additional supportive evidence in favor of the fact that foreign exchange in-
tervention slowed down the appreciation of the koruna from 1999 to 2002, especially when foreign
exchange interventions were supported by interest rate policy in a consistent manner.
7 Finally,
￿gert and Lang (2005) also reveal that although the Croatian central bank was not particularly suc-
cessful in in￿uencing the exchange rate during the late 1990s in Croatia, of￿cial foreign exchange
intervention was fairly effective in turning the trend on the foreign exchange markets from 2000 to
6 BIS (2005) provides a collection of foreign exchange intervention practices in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
a large number of emerging market economies.
7 The con￿icting results obtained by Disyatat and Galati (2005) on the one hand, and Holub (2004) and ￿gert and Komarek
(2005) on the other hand, might be due to the omission of macroeconomic news from the event study approaches. However,
weak instruments may also have caused the failure of Disyatat and Galati (2005) to ￿nd that foreign exchange interventions
are not successful. Their estimation results obtained from 2001 to 2002 may be considerably weakened by the fact that only
three observations for foreign exchange intervention are available for 2001.
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4.2 Exchange Rates and Prices
Nominal exchange rate movements caused by monetary policy action have the potential
8 to be
translated into domestic in￿ation on the grounds of a modi￿cation of imported ￿nal goods prices,
and because an alteration in the price of imported intermediate goods puts downward or upward
pressure on domestic in￿ation via the price of domestically manufactured tradable and nontradable
goods.
How the exchange rate affects domestic prices via imported prices in the end depends crucially
on the pricing behavior of importing ￿rms. If prices are set in the importer’s currency (producer
currency pricing ￿ PCP), any change in the exchange rate will be automatically transmitted to
the prices of the destination country. This implies complete exchange rate pass-through, which is
sometimes also referred to as Grassman’s law, and the validity of the law of one price, since the
real exchange rate remains stable.
9
Alternatively, if the price of imported goods is ￿xed in the local currency (local or consumer
currency pricing ￿ LCP), exchange rate movements are not re￿ected in domestic prices and the
pass-through is zero. As a consequence, the real exchange rate may drift away from the level
given by the law of one price and is correlated with the nominal exchange rate.
10 Importing ￿rms
practicing LCP will alter their markup in response to changes in the exchange rate, while those
engaging in PCP usually adjust their output and labor in response to changes in local prices.
4.2.1 Differing Pass-Through for Imported, Producer and Consumer Prices
A typical ￿nding of the empirical literature for imported goods prices in industrialized countries
is that the pass-through lies between 0 and 1, which disquali￿es both LCP and PCP (Campa and
8 The word potential has to be underlined here, as a great deal of factors aside from monetary policy have the ability to cause
the exchange rate to change. As a result, the pass-through of the exchange rate to prices is only partly due to monetary policy action.
9 Anotherimplicationisthatachangeintherelativepriceofimportedanddomesticgoodswillshiftconsumptionfromonetypeof
good to the other (expenditure switching).
10 This is indeed a well documented fact for industrialized countries (see MacDonald, 2005).
16Goldberg, 2002).
11 The incomplete pass-through to import prices may be due to third-degree price
discrimination, eventually preventing a complete pass-through even for homogeneous imported
goods.
However, even if we assume perfect pass-through for imported goods, the large body of litera-
ture dealing with the exchange rate pass-through usually pins down the following hierarchy across
prices: The pass-through is highest for imported goods, is lower for producer goods and is lowest
forconsumerprices. Althoughthisisnotsurprisingat￿rstglanceforpurelydomesticallyproduced
goods and services (without any imported intermediate input), there are two ways of looking at the
pass-though result:
1.) One strand of the literature emphasizes the role of distribution costs for ￿nal imported
goods. As imported goods reach consumers through wholesaling and retailing networks (including
transportation, marketing and advertisement), their prices have a substantial local input, which
serves as a buffer to soften the impact of exchange rate changes. Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(2002, 2004), for example, show that large devaluations of the home currency are not re￿ected in
in￿ation of corresponding size because of the distribution sector and because consumers switch
from imported goods to lower-quality ￿ and hence cheaper ￿ local brands (￿ight from quality).
Analogously, large appreciations may not necessarily yield lower in￿ation if there is a ￿ight to
quality.
2.) Other researchers emphasize the role of intermediate imported goods by assuming that
importedgoodsareintermediategoodstowhichPCPapplies(thatis, thepass-throughiscomplete).
The price of ￿nal goods, which is a combination of the price of imported intermediate goods and
of local goods, is set in local currency (Engel, 2002).
12 The pass-through would be higher than
zero but sluggish in the event that prices in local currency are adjusted periodically (due to sticky
prices) when exchange rate movements could also be incorporated.
11 Choudhry et al. (2005) ￿nd that the theoretical model that best ￿ts the data is the one that incorporates sticky prices and
wages, distribution costs and a combination of LCP and PCP.
12 In this sense, there is expenditure switching for the producer and not for the consumer.
174.2.2 A Slowdown of the Pass-Through to Prices Over Time
Another important ￿nding in the literature is that the exchange rate pass-through is higher for
developing countries and that it declines over time both for industrialized and for developing coun-
tries.
13 Two explanations are advanced for this observation in the literature. The ￿rst one relates to
the role of macroeconomic variables, especially in￿ation. The second option considers the shift in
imports from goods with higher pass-through elasticities to goods with lower ones.
The Role of the Macroeconomic Environment Taylor (2000) conjectured that the slowdown
in the pass-through (and the difference between developing and industrialized countries) is due to
changes in the macroeconomic environment, in particular in the level and variability of in￿ation
rates. This proposition has been extensively tested in a two-stage approach similar to that used
for the investigation of the determinants of the interest rate pass-through.
14 Devereux and Yetman
(2003), Choudhri and Hakura (2001) and Ca’Zorzi, Hahn and Sanchez (2005) rely on a two-stage
approach for a large number of countries to show that that high in￿ation is conducive to perfect
pass-through and is often associated with complete pass-through. Bailliu and Fujii (2004) use a
panel setting in which changes in in￿ation rates are controlled for by means of dummy variables.
In contrast to the earlier literature, it turns out that the pass-through declined for import, producer
and consumer prices for a set of 11 OECD countries during the 1990s. Gagnon and Ihrig (2001),
and especially Soto and Selaive (2003), claim that in￿ation variability is more important than the
level of the in￿ation. In addition, Soto and Selaive (2003) also ￿nd openness and country size to
be important factors in determining the pass-through. The higher the openness and the smaller a
country is,
15 they argue, the higher the pass-through is.
13 Campa and Goldberg (2002) argue that the decline in the exchange rate pass-through can be observed only for half of the
OECD countries.
14 First, country-speci￿c exchange rate pass-through coef￿cients are estimated. Second, the estimated coef￿cients are regressed on
a number of candidate explanatory variables.
15 They measure openness in three alternative ways: (1) imports to GDP, (2) import duties as a share of imports, and (3) tariff rates
on intermediate and capital goods.
18The Composition of Trade and Imports Even though Campa and Goldberg (2002) con￿rm
the importance of in￿ation, and of exchange rate volatility,
16 they emphasize that the macroeco-
nomic factors are dominated in the long run by what they call the ￿composition effect.￿ As the
pass-through is nearly complete for energy and raw materials and is considerably lower than unity
for food and manufactured products, a shift in the composition of imports from raw materials to
manufactured goods, the argument goes, induces a decline in the exchange rate pass-through for
imported goods. The econometric tests support this idea for a sample of OECD countries. This
kind of reasoning could be applied to explain why the pass-through is higher for developing coun-
tries (which import more high pass-through goods) than for developed countries (which import
more low-pass-through goods).
Evidence Based on Individual Imported Goods Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) study
the pass-through to prices of individual goods
17 for a large set of countries. In general, it turns
out that the pass-through is not complete for import prices at the dock. Also, the pass-through to
import prices in the U.S.A. is found to be considerably lower than in other developed economies.
Given the high disaggregation of the data, the composition effect cannot be at the root of this
phenomenon, which detracts from the Campa and Goldberg argument. However, they also ￿nd
that the pass-through to import prices increased over time while it decreased for the retail and CPI
level for developing countries (but not for developed ones).
The Role of Expectiations Finally, at the heart of the pass-through process are expectations of
the extent of the pass-through and the transitory or permanent nature of the change in the exchange
rate. While changes perceived as transitory will not affect prices, those regarded as permanent will
impact on prices. The literature does not in general deal with the role of the exchange rate regime,
16 Note that Soto and Selaive (2003) cannot ￿nd evidence, for a larger sample, of exchange rate volatility as a driving force
behind exchange rate pass-through.
17 Marlboro cigarettes, Coca-Cola, cognac, Gilbey’s gin, Time magazine, Kodak color ￿lm, Cointreau liqueur and Martini &
Rossi vermouth.
19although the pass-through is thought to be higher for countries where the exchange rate serves as
a nominal anchor to in￿ationary expectations. In these countries, any change in the exchange rate
will be rapidly incorporated into expectations and thus into prices (both tradable and nontradable).
In contrast, if the exchange rate is not used as an intermediary target, expectations are not that
strongly associated with the exchange rate, resulting in a lower pass-through. In a ￿oating regime,
exchange rate changes will have little in￿uence on nontradable prices.
4.3 Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Transition Economies
A common practice in the literature is to estimate the exchange rate pass-through either relying
on (recursive) VAR models devised by McCarthy (1999) or using a single equation approach that
incorporates differenced variables (Campa and Goldberg, 2002) or that employs single equations
in which the deviation from the long-run equilibrium exchange rate is modeled (Frankel, Parsley
and Wei, 2005). Evidently, the exchange rate pass-through is intimately related to equilibrium ex-
change rates and to real misalignments. Both the VAR approach and the single-equation approach
largely ignore this issue, which may mean that there is an omitted variable bias which could have
serious implications for the estimated pass-through. For industrialized countries, this means that
large nonequilibrium deviations from PPP should be accounted for when analyzing the exchange
rate pass-through (Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2005). The issue is possibly even more important for
transition countries because their equilibrium exchange rates exhibit large changes, in particular
a strong trend appreciation during the phase of economic transformation.
18 Hence, the trending
movement of the equilibrium exchange rate and the deviation of the real exchange rate from this
trend should be clearly considered for the study of the pass-through. Darvas (2001) stands out from
the rest of the literature in that it models the equilibrium exchange rate and the degree of exchange
rate pass-through jointly. In particular, the author ￿rst estimates the equilibrium exchange rate
using the single-equation Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach. Next, prices
and the nominal exchange rate are estimated using the following system:
18 For an overview of this issue, see e.g. ￿gert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006).
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where (qt￿1 ￿ q
EQ
t￿1) measures the misalignment of the real exchange rate. In this setting,
￿represents the instantaneous long-run pass-through. Moreover, Darvas (2001) allows for time-
varying parameters in his speci￿cation, given that the pass-through may (and, according to his
results, does) change over time.
Notwithstanding the substantial shortcomings on the estimation side,
19 the average exchange
rate pass-through reported in the row ￿average￿ of table 2 reveals the incomplete nature of the pass-
through from the exchange rate to prices, not only in the short run but also at a longer horizon.Table
2 also shows the term structure of the pass-through, which turns out to be highest for import prices
with an average pass-through of 62%. A 1% change in the exchange rate results in an average
0.52% change in producer prices. Finally, as expected, the overall impact is the lowest on the CPI.
A ￿rst obvious speci￿c observation is the large heterogeneity across countries regarding the
pass-through to the CPI. CPI in￿ation is less affected by the exchange rate in the Czech Republic
and is highest in Slovenia (53%) and Bulgaria (68%). The pass-through is also below the sample
average for Romania (for the U.S. dollar).
In addition, two tentative observations can be made. The pass-through to the CPI tends to be
higher for countries at a lower stage of development (Korhonen and Wachtel, 2005). Also, we
can observe a larger pass-through for countries with an accommodative monetary policy at some
stage (Slovenia and Romania). If a country operates an explicit or implicit crawling peg exchange
rate regime, the preannounced devaluation of the currency provides a nominal anchor for expec-
tations. As changes in the exchange rate may signal changes in prices, changes in the exchange
19 Another cautionary note is in order: some authors use sample periods going well before economic transition started in 1990.
Campa and Goldberg (2002), Choudhri and Hakura (2001) and Soto and Selaive (2003) employ data going back to the 1970s,
while the sample period starts in 1988 for Hungary in Ca’Zorzi, Hahn and Sanchez (2005).
21rate will generate corresponding changes in prices not only for tradables but also for nontradables
via the expectation channel. This would imply a high and quite homogeneous pass-through for the
whole CPI. The move toward more exchange rate ￿exibility, coupled with an in￿ation targeting
framework, may break the link between the exchange rate and prices by disconnecting primarily
nontradables from the exchange rate (Coricelli, Jacbec and Masten, 2003; Darvas, 2001; Kara et
al., 2005).
However, studies focusing on one country sometimes strongly disagree regarding the size of
the pass-through. One prominent example is Estonia: while Dabu￿inskas (2003) ￿nds a zero pass-
through to the CPI,
20 Bitans (2004) reports an average pass-through of 53%.
Second, for the Russian case Dobrynskaya and Levando (2005) identify a higher pass-through to
food and goods prices (around 50% and 30% in the long run) and virtually no pass-through to
services. The ￿nding for food is broadly in line with Dabu￿inskas (2003) for Estonia. However,
somewhat oddly, there is no pass-through for goods in the Estonian CPI.
Mihaljek and Klau (2001) claim that using a measure of CPI gleaned from nonmarket prices,
such as administered and regulated prices, increases the long-run pass-through. Comparing their
estimates for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland with the rest of the sample veri￿es this
assumption. Along these lines, it turns out that the pass-through is biased downward by roughly
10% for Latvia when the price measure includes nonmarket prices (Bitans, 2004).
The exchange rate pass-through is found to be higher for the producer price index (PPI) than for
the CPI for all countries except Croatia and Russia. Even for the Czech Republic, which has the
lowest pass-through to the CPI, roughly 40% of exchange rate changes are passed on to producer
prices. For the remaining countries, the pass-through to the PPI is usually above 50%. It is also
more convenient to take the market-based component of the PPI. While no pass-through could be
found on the basis of the overall PPI for Estonia, the PPI for manufacturing (net e.g. of energy,
20 Given that the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed vis-￿-vis the euro in the currency board arrangement, the pass-through measures
how changes in the nominal effective exchange rate are translated into in￿ation.
22mining prices) re￿ects a large amount of changes in the effective exchange rate. Overall, the
producer prices of manufactured goods, in particular machinery and equipment, are more receptive
to changes in the exchange rate than other items are.
The pass-through to the price of imported goods is nearly complete in Estonia, Hungary and
Poland and is complete in Slovakia, while it is below the pass-through to the PPI for Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovenia. Although a similar degree of heterogeneity can be found for subgroups
of imported goods, the pass-through is highest in machinery, followed by other manufactured and
chemical goods.
Third, the pass-through appears to be larger against the anchor or reference currency. This point
is clearly demonstrated for Romania (Gueorguiev, 2003; Korhonen and Wachtel, 2005), where the
pass-through is about twice as large against the dollar as against the euro. Inversely, changes in the
dollar exchange rate matter little for prices in the Czech Republic and Hungary, for instance.
Finally, and overall, although the pass-through may have increased up to the mid- or late 1990s
(Campa and Goldberg, 2002), it seems to have been falling since then, as convincingly evidenced
by Bitans (2004), who argues that this ￿nding is closely related to the decline in in￿ation rates.
An interesting ￿nding is that the pass-through for manufactured goods tends to be higher than for
raw materials both for import and for producer prices (Rodzko, 2004). This could invalidate the
composition effect put forth by Campa and Goldberg (2002).
21
21 A criticism of the above work lies in its failure to address possible asymmetries in the pass-through. The pass-through could
be different depending on whether the exchange rate depreciates, appreciates or does neither, whether changes in the exchange
rateexceedacertainthreshold(arelargeenough)orhowmuchtheexchangeratedeviatesfromitsequilibriumlevel. Theexploration
of these issues awaits future research.
23Table 2 Summary of the Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Import prices PPI CPI
short-run long-run short-run long-run short-run long-run
Average of the sample
Average 0.44 0.70 0.16 0.52 0.31 0.33
Country-speci￿c averages
CEE-5
Czech Rep. 0.34 0.65 ￿ 0.41 0.10 0.23
Hungary 0.58 0.87 ￿ 0.57 0.38 0.30
Poland 0.57 0.84 ￿ 0.60 ￿ 0.31
Slovakia 0.41 1.01 ￿ 0.73 ￿ 0.35
Slovenia 0.26 0.40 ￿ 0.78 0.20 0.53
Baltic Three
Estonia 0.59 0.83 ￿ 0.47 0.00 0.35
Latvia 0.43 0.45 ￿ 0.66 ￿ 0.39
Lithuania 0.22 0.32 ￿ 0.55 0.07 0.32
SEE
Bulgaria ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.94 ￿ 0.68
Croatia ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.17 ￿ 0.22
Romania
(EFF/EUR) ￿ ￿ 0.22 0.48 0.06 0.21
(USD) ￿ ￿ 0.23 0.53 0.28 0.42
CIS
Russia ￿ ￿ 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.40
Ukraine ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.44
Note: The averages are based on nonnegative pass-through estimates. Negative pass-through estimates were set to zero.
The average of country speci￿c averages does not equal the ￿gure given in the row ￿Average,￿ as the sample speci￿c
average is obtained as the average of all available pass-through estimates. EFF, EUR and USD indicate the pass-through
from the effective exchange rate and from the euro and dollar exchange rates, respectively.
4.4 The Impact of the Exchange Rate on Trade and Investment
As regards trade ￿ows, an appreciation (depreciation) of the exchange rate is thought to penalize
(promote) exports and increase (decrease) imports, leading to a deteriorating (improving) trade
balance. However, this holds true only if the Marshall-Lerner condition is veri￿ed and the sum
of the price elasticities of export and import demand is higher than unity. The functioning of the
Marshall-Lerner condition is also based on full pass-through to import prices (in local currency)
24and zero pass-through to export prices (in foreign currency). Hence, the failure of complete pass-
through implies that the Marshall-Lerner condition need not apply.
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2004) document the fact that the import content of investment
is signi￿cantly higher than the import content of consumption. As a result, the pass-through to
investment prices is potentially higher than that to the price of consumer goods. However, the
pass-through is also incomplete because of the nontradable component of investment. The bulk
of the nontradable component in investment is due to construction services while the share of
distribution services is negligible.
Campa and Goldberg (1995) postulate that the impact of the exchange rate on sectoral invest-
ment depends on the export share and the import content of production of the sector. More speci￿-
cally, exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) expands (decreases) investment if the export share
is high. A high import content of sectoral production works in the opposite direction. Further-
more, high markup sectors tend not to respond to exchange rate movements in investment demand,
whereas low markup sectors respond more strongly to changes in the exchange rate.
We can draw a connection here between the exchange rate channel and the credit channel. The
effect of the credit channel (see below) on the economic activity of ￿rms constrained by external
￿nance is exacerbated if these ￿rms are in low markup sectors. The second relation linking the ex-
change rate channel and the credit channel is the in￿uence of exchange rate movements on foreign
currency-denominated assets and liabilities in ￿rms’ balance sheet and thus their net wealth. If
changes in the exchange rate impact signi￿cantly on ￿rms’ balance sheet, they will in￿uence these
￿rms’ capacity to borrow externally (broad lending channel). A collapse in investment due to an
exchange rate-induced fall in ￿rms’ net wealth may outweigh competitiveness gains, provided the
Marshall-Lerner condition is veri￿ed (Carranza, Gald￿n-SÆnchez and G￿mez-Biscarri, 2004).
It is worth mentioning that not only the level but also the variability of the exchange rate is
an important factor for trade and investment. Although the relationship between exchange rate
volatility and aggregate or bilateral export ￿ows seems to be ambiguous for developed countries,
25differentiating between sectors suggests a negative relationship between exchange rate volatility
and export ￿ows. Hence, the higher the exchange rate volatility is, the more trade is penalized, and
consequently the more investment is affected. Nonetheless, the impact of volatility differs both
in magnitude and direction across sectors. For developing countries, the literature unanimously
supports the hypothesis that exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on exports ￿ows (for an
overview, see e.g. McKenzie, 1999).
￿gert and Morales-Zumaquero (2005) studied the in￿uence of exchange rate volatility on ex-
ports for a number of CEE countries. On the basis of standard export equations, augmented with
foreign direct investment (FDI), the panel estimations indicate that a rise in foreign exchange
volatility, measured either directly or via changes in the exchange rate regime, hinders exports and
that this negative impact is transmitted with some delay rather than instantaneously. It turns out that
the sectors which account for up to 80% of exports, such as chemicals and different types of manu-
facturing, suffer most from increased exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless, country-speci￿c time
series estimations reveal a great deal of heterogeneity across countries. For instance, there is little
or weak evidence in favor of a negative relation between foreign exchange volatility and exports
in Slovenia, Russia and Romania, while for Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the
estimation results provide reasonably robust evidence on the detrimental effect of foreign exchange
volatility on exports.
5 The Asset Price Channel
Monetary policy is also capable of in￿uencing asset prices, such as equity and housing. From a
monetarist viewpoint, in the event that an expansionary monetary policy results in increased money
supply, the actual level of liquidity held by the public will exceed its desired level. This, in turn,
leads market participants to seek to decrease liquidity at their disposal by buying equity, bonds and
housing, which results in a rise in the respective prices. An increase in bond prices is automatically
translated into a decrease in the interest rate, which is already under pressure through the interest
26rate channel. Falling interest rates will then increase the attractiveness of equities, fueling equity
purchases and causing equity prices to rise further. However, asset price reactions to monetary
policy action can be asymmetric in nature. For instance, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) show for
the U.S.A. that the reaction of stock prices to a change in the interest rate is ampli￿ed if the change
in the interest rate is unexpected,
22 if the change is in the direction opposed to that of the previous
period, and in the presence of high stock market volatility.
5.1 The Non￿nancial Corporate Sector
Higher equity prices eventually exert an in￿uence on investment spending by altering the relation-
ship between the cost of capital and the stock market valuation of that capital. This mechanism is
described by Tobin’s Q theory, where Q is de￿ned as the market value of ￿rms over the replace-
ment cost of capital. Similarly, an increase in equity prices also affects household spending via the
wealth effect. The basic idea behind Q is that as Q rises above unity, ￿rms ￿nd their market value to
be high relative to the replacement cost of capital; therefore, new investments are cheaper relative
to the market value of ￿rms. As a consequence, issuing fewer new shares at high prices enables
￿rms to buy more new equipment at lower prices, which results in higher investment spending.
The Q theory is also applicable to the housing market. For example, a higher-than-unity Q
implies a market value above replacement cost, which promotes construction output. Conversely,
if Q is below 1, ￿rms would not seek to buy new equipment because it is more advantageous to
acquire other ￿rms with a market value below their replacement cost of capital. Likewise, it is more
favorable to buy old houses instead of constructing new ones. As a result, investment, household
spending and construction activity decrease.
The empirical literature on Tobin’s Q focuses on whether investment is correlated more with
stock markets than with fundamentals (such as sales, cash ￿ow, pro￿ts or the net present value
of pro￿ts). While some authors ￿nd that investment closely follows fundamentals (Blanchard,
22 The strong form of the ef￿cient market hypothesis holds that asset prices incorporate all available information (even not publicly
available information). Hence, only the unexpected component of the change can have an in￿uence on asset prices.
27Rhee and Summers, 1993), and that it is arguably dif￿cult to relate Tobin’s Q to the evolution of
investment because of problems encountered when measuring the replacement cost of capital, there
appears to be a broad consensus in the literature that stock prices and market valuation matter, to
some extent, for investment decisions (Alexandre, 2002).
If market valuation plays a role in investment decisions, large ￿uctuations in asset prices un-
related to fundamentals, which lead to an over- or undervaluation of asset prices, can cause over-
or underinvestment.
23 This raises the question of whether monetary policy should respond to asset
price bubbles. The question is all the more relevant as asset price booms and busts are observed
to occur on a regular basis (Filardo, 2004). According to Bernanke and Gertler (2000), monetary
policy should react to asset prices only if they in￿uence expected future in￿ation. It is also argued
that reacting to asset prices may induce increased in￿ation volatility. However, Alexandre (2002)
demonstrates that reacting to nonfundamental shocks to asset prices not only leads to more stabil-
ity in in￿ation and asset prices, but also to more stable investment and thus, ultimately, to more
stable output. Filardo (2004) argues that monetary policy should step in only in the event that an
asset price bubble has macroeconomic implications (￿macroeconomic￿ asset price bubble). Al-
though it may prove tricky to identify and to react to such bubbles, Cecchetti et al. (2000) consider
uncertainty not to exceed that prevailing for other parts of the monetary transmission mechanism.
In addition, bubbles in different asset markets may be related to one another, which makes it
even more dif￿cult to deal with them properly. It is a stylized fact that the collapse of stock market
bubbles is typically followed by a surge in property prices, largely as a consequence of a monetary
loosening to ease the effects of the burst of the bubble on the equity market. Hence, ￿bubbles beget
bubbles via a policy channel￿ (Filardi, 2004).
5.2 Households
The wealth effect channel of equity and property prices is closely related to Modigliani’s lifecycle
23 The fundamental component of asset prices re￿ects fundamentals such as the net present value of pro￿ts or dividends and hence
does not lead to changes in fundamentals. In contrast, the nonfundamental part of asset prices leads to distortions in investment
decisions, and thus leads to changes in fundamentals (Filardo, 2004).
28theory, in which household consumption spending is believed to be driven by disposable lifetime
wealth. Because equity and property is part of this wealth, a rise (fall) in equity and housing prices
triggered by monetary policy action results in increasing (diminishing) lifetime wealth and thus
leads to an increase (decrease) in consumption spending.
An alternative view to the wealth effect is the so-called liquidity effect. In line with Mishkin
(2001), spending on durable goods and housing is to a large extent in￿uenced by consumers’
perception of the likelihood of running into ￿nancial dif￿culties. The higher the ratio of liquid
￿nancial assets to debt is, the lower the probability of ￿nancial distress will be. Thus, an increase
in equity prices decreases the danger of future problems related to debt and therefore encourages
households to consume more goods and housing.
5.3 Spillover from or to Other Channels
The asset price channel interferes with other channels of the monetary transmission mechanism,
and hence may amplify the overall transmission, mainly through the broad lending channel. A rise
(fall) in the price of an asset (such as stocks, bonds or housing) triggered by monetary policy action
strengthens (weakens) the balance sheet of ￿rms and households. This, in turn, increases (lowers)
their capacity to borrow from external sources because of the lower (higher) external ￿nancing
premium.
If the credit channel is operational, an increase (decrease) in interest rates can lead to a drop
(rise) in the stock price of ￿rms which are subject to ￿nancial constraint because such ￿rms are
unable to supply their preferred amount of goods and services, so their expected future pro￿ts
fall. This effect, in turn, has a feedback effect on the credit channel, since a change in stock
prices changes the external ￿nancing premium (plus the wealth effect) of the ￿rm and of ￿rms and
households that hold shares of the ￿rm.
A change in the monetary policy stance can also make ￿rms’ share prices more heterogeneous.
The market valuation of ￿rms which produce interest-sensitive goods or services will change more,
as a change in interest rates modi￿es the demand for their goods and services (interest rate channel,
29Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004). In a second stage, such ￿rms are more exposed to the credit
channel.
Kiss and Vadas (2005), the only study that analyzes asset prices ￿ in particular housing prices ￿
in monetary transmission in transition economies, ￿nd that both the wealth and the credit channel
are at work in the Hungarian housing market, even though the effect of monetary policy has only
a limited impact on house prices, housing investment and consumption. One important reason for
this ￿nding is that the institutional setting and public subsidy schemes insulate the housing market
from monetary policy actions.
6 The Credit Channel
According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the traditional interest rate channel performs poorly, as
changes in the long-term real interest rate, i.e. the cost of capital, appear to be only weakly related
to changes in global demand and thus fail to explain the ampli￿cation effect of short-term interest
rates on output. Given this, they extend the transmission mechanism by introducing the credit
channel, which, they argue, is an enhancement channel that ampli￿es the interest rate channel. The
credit channel can be decomposed into two distinct channels: (1) the bank lending channel and (2)
the broad lending channel (also termed balance sheet channel or ￿nancial accelerator), which are
dealt with below.
24
6.1 The Bank Lending Channel
The bank lending channel can be formally modeled by introducing credit into the product markets
in the traditional IS-LM setup (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988), where the IS curve is replaced by the
credit-commodity (CC) curve to produce the CC-LM model. Central to the bank lending channel is
the imperfect substitutability between credits and other ￿nancial assets in the banks’ balance sheet
on the one hand, and that between bank credits and other forms of ￿nancing on ￿rms’ balance
24 AdetailedoverviewofthetheoreticalandempiricalliteraturerelatedtothebanklendingchannelcanbefoundinKierzenkowski
(2004).
30sheet on the other hand. These two forms of imperfect substitutability cause monetary policy to
impact on economic activity in two stages.
Imperfect substitution in banks’ assets ensures that a tightening (loosening) of monetary pol-
icy brings about a contraction (expansion) in banks’ credit supply (the ￿rst stage). When facing
a decrease in liquidity,
25 banks decrease their credit supply instead of selling bonds they possess
because they have the desired level of liquidity to face, for instance, unexpected deposit with-
drawals. Alternatively, banks could also issue bonds or collect deposits from households or from
the corporate sector rather than decrease credit. However, the ability of some banks to borrow from
￿nancial markets may be limited by ￿nancial market imperfections, such as adverse selection and
moral hazard (imperfect substitutability between credits and bonds on the asset side and bonds and
deposits on the liability side).
For monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy, it is necessary for some ￿rms not to
be capable of substituting bank credit for other forms of external funding on the capital markets
(imperfect substitutability on the liability side of ￿rms).
26 In such a case, once credit supply has de-
creased (increased), investment spending will be cut back because of the lack of external ￿nancial
resources (second stage).
Underlying the analysis of Bernanke and Blinder are the hypotheses that (1) the income elas-
ticities of credit demand and money demand are the same, and (2) the interest elasticity of credit
demand equals that of credit supply. Kierzenkowski (2005a, 2005b) has recently shown that relax-
ing, in particular, hypothesis (2) implies that the bank lending channel need not automatically lead
25 Bernanke and Blinder assume that the central bank controls base money, and that a tightening (loosening) of monetary policy
decreases (increases) the liquidity of the banking sector. Alternatively, it is also possible to model monetary policy, which controls
the interest rate. A simple way is to assume the stability of money demand functions, through which a change in the interest
rate affects monetary aggregates. A more elaborate way is to introduce some kind of monetary policy reaction function, which
links the policy rate to other variables.
26 Central to this analysis is the special role banks play in the presence of asymmetric information, which has been widely
acknowledged since the seminal articles of Akerlof (1970) and Fama (1985). In addition to reducing transaction costs (the cost of
searching, verifying and monitoring costs) and transforming maturity, banks are in a good position to reduce problems related
to asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard), i.e. transforming risk. For a recent general overview on market
imperfections, see DeGennaro (2005).
31to an ampli￿cation in this framework and can, importantly, also cause attenuation.
6.2 The Broad Lending Channel27
Imperfect substitution in banks’ assets and in ￿rms’ liabilities, the cornerstone of the Bernanke-
Blinder model, is not necessarily the case. In accordance with Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993),
while small banks cannot borrow on ￿nancial markets, larger banks de￿nitely can. Similarly, larger
￿rms have access to capital markets and can escape bank credit supply contraction. This leads us
to a larger concept, namely to the broad lending channel. Imperfect substitution no longer exists
between bank credits and other ￿nancing but between external and internal ￿nancing,
28 where the
cost of external ￿nancing is higher with the external ￿nancing premium. The external ￿nancing
premium, in turn, primarily depends on net wealth
29 serving as collateral for loans and credits. The
higher the net wealth of the borrower is, the lower the external risk premium is mainly because
(1) higher (expected future) revenues enable one to ￿nance investment internally, and (2) more
valuable collateral increases the safety of the lender, thus decreasing both moral hazard and adverse
selection. Consequently, any change in net wealth generated directly or indirectly by monetary
policy will be re￿ected in the risk premium and thus in the capacity to borrow. Monetary policy
can in￿uence net wealth via the interest rate, asset price and exchange rate channels described
earlier:
1.) Income effect (or cash-￿ow channel): An increase (decrease) in short term interest rates
increases (decreases) the cost of servicing short-term and ￿oating-rate debt, which reduces (raises)
cash ￿ow and thus net wealth.
2.) Debt channel: An unexpected rise in in￿ation makes the real costs of servicing the debt
lower, the terms of which are determined in nominal terms.
3.) Asset price channel 1: An increase (decrease) in short-term interest rates lowers (increases)
27 This channel is also termed ￿nancial accelerator, balance sheet channel or borrower net worth channel.
28 This contrasts with the Modigliani and Miller theorem on the neutrality of internal and external funding. Note that in the
broad lending channel, banks no longer play a special role, like they do in the bank lending channel.
29 Net worth or net assets are obtained as total assets minus total liabilities.
32the price of equity, bonds and housing, which thus directly in￿uences net wealth.
4.) Asset price channel 2 (wealth and liquidity effect of households): monetary policy can
impact on household borrowing capacity, as described in the asset price channel.
30
5.) Exchange rate channel: If assets or credits/loans are denominated in foreign currency,
nominal exchange rate developments can increase (decrease) their value in domestic currency,
which also exerts an in￿uence on borrowing capacity.
6.) Second-round effects: If household or ￿rm spending falls as a consequence of monetary
policy action, other ￿rms’ revenue also falls, leading to a decrease in net wealth as a function of
rigidities on the cost side.
Therefore, decreasing (increasing) net wealth by lowering both equity and housing prices and
cash ￿ow (income effect) results in a decreased (improved) capacity to obtain loans because of the
aforementioned imperfections of ￿nancial markets (adverse selection and moral hazard), which
provoke a decrease (increase) in investment and consumption spending.
It is worth mentioning that the broad lending channel conveys not only the effects of monetary
policy, not simply because of changes in monetary conditions but also because alterations of other
exogenous factors may lead to changes in the balance sheet of both households and non￿nancial
corporations.
6.3 The Trade Credit and the Bank Lending Channel
Trade credit, which is usually created if a ￿rm delays payment to its supplier, is thought to be
more expensive than bank credit. However, this holds true only during ￿normal￿ times. Because
the terms of trade credit are fairly stable over time, trade credit may become cheaper relative to
bank credit in the wake of a monetary policy tightening. In fact, trade credit may become the only
external source of ￿nancing for ￿rms which have no credit rating and thus no access to capital
30 It is noteworthy that both the bank lending channel and the broad lending channel apply not only to the investment of the
non￿nancial corporate sector but also to household spending. On the one hand, a fall in credit supply related to consumption
or housing reduces credit to households, which are particularly bank dependent. On the other hand, a decrease in the price of
assets(bondsandequities)andhousingheldbyhouseholdsandafallinincomereducesthevalueofhouseholds’ collateralforloans.
33markets during credit rationing. As a result, if ￿rms also have access to trade credit, instead of
only bank and market ￿nancing, ￿rms hit by external ￿nancing constraints in the wake of monetary
tightening can potentially avoid the squeeze by increasing trade credit (see Mateut, 2004).
31
6.4 The Bank Capital Channel32
A number of recent papers put strong emphasis on the prominent role bank equity capital plays
in the monetary transmission mechanism ￿ also called the bank capital channel ￿ through which
monetary policy in￿uences credit supply. The standard credit channel literature has been criti-
cized because it assumes that the central bank affects loan supply by altering the required reserves.
Chmielewski (2005) stresses that reserve requirements may be inappropriate, as, for instance,
in￿ation-targeting central banks which use the interest rate as their main policy instrument may
not be able to control required reserves. Yet changes in bank capital requirements may strongly
affect loan supply. The bank capital channel has been formalized, for instance, by Van den Heuvel
(2002). For the bank capital channel to be operational, the following assumptions need to apply:
(1) it is costly for banks to raise equity, (2) banks assume an interest rate risk, with the maturity
of their credit being higher than that of their deposits, and (3) capital regulations in￿uence banks’
credit supply.
The mechanism works as follows. A rise in interest rates triggered by monetary policy action
increases the cost of ￿nancing (deposits) while leaving the remuneration of bank assets unchanged
due to the maturity mismatch. This induces a fall in bank capital. In the event that the bank is
close to the minimum capital requirement prescribed by law, it is obliged to decrease the supply of
loans, as raising equity is costly.
According to Van den Heuvel (2002), banks with low capital react slowly but then in an am-
pli￿ed fashion to monetary policy shocks. Even banks with high capital can adjust their loan
31 Trade credit amounts to up to a quarter of ￿rms’ liabilities in the U.S.A., Germany, France and Italy (Mateut, Bougheas
and Mizen, 2003) and is considerably higher in the U.K. (Kohler, Britton and Yates, 2000).
32 Although the literature typically views the bank capital channel as a separate channel from the credit channel,
for the sake of convenience, we put it in the same basket, because its implications are very close to those of the credit channel.
34portfolio if they expect trouble in meeting capital requirements in the future or, as emphasized by
Chmielewski (2005), they intend to maintain the same level of riskiness of their loan portfolio.
In a banking system where banks possess a considerable amount of corporate equity, like in
Germany, any change to the price of corporate equity will have a direct impact on banks’ pro￿t,
capital and consequently on their credit supply (Markovic, 2004).
Markovic (2004) distinguishes between three subchannels of the bank capital channel:
1.) The default risk channel. This channel is related to the eventuality that the bank defaults on
its equity, which, in turn, depends on the default risk of ￿rms.
2.) The adjustment cost channel. This channel re￿ects asymmetric information between the
bank and its shareholders and the fact that the elimination of this asymmetry is costly.
3.) The capital loss channel.
Markovic (2004) argues that the capital cost channel is likely to gain importance in the occur-
rence of large shocks to bank capital, such as the writeoff of nonperforming loans or changes in
the regulatory framework.
6.5 Trojan Horses Affecting the Credit Channel
There are a number of potential sources which could counteract the transmission mechanism of the
bank lending channel in its ￿rst and second stages and the internal-external ￿nancing constraint
crucial for the broad lending channel.
6.5.1 Factors Interfering with the First Stage of the Bank Lending Channel
1.) Multibank holding networks are conducive to the creation of internal capital markets from
which af￿liated banks can bene￿t even though external ￿nancing resources have dried up. This
is especially important for small banks, as, contrary to the basic assumption of the Bernanke and
Blinder model, they can insulate their loan supply from monetary policy shocks (Ashcraft, 2005).
This implies that a smaller number of banks are subject to imperfect substitutability on the asset
side. In extreme cases where most banks belong to banking networks, as is the case in Germany or
35in Finland, the bank lending channel might be completely disabled. Ehrmann and Worms (2004)
arguethatinsuchcases, theexistenceofthebanklendingchanneldependsonthe￿nancialsituation
of the network and not on the ￿nancial health of the individual banks. Gambacorta (2005) also shed
light on the network effect for Italian banks.
2.) A banking system which is well capitalized overall may be less conductive for the bank
capital channel.
3.) A high degree of concentration of the banking sector implies the absence of small banks. As
large banks have easier access to alternative external ￿nancing, they can buffer their credit supply
from monetary policy shocks (Adams and Amel, 2005).
4.) There is crucial interaction between the credit channel and the interest rate pass-through. It
appears that more concentrated markets are less vulnerable to the credit channel. At the same time,
banks on these markets do not tend to react proportionately to interest rate changes. Hence, they
cushion the effect of monetary policy not only for quantities but also for prices, and this weakens
the overall impact of monetary policy on the real economy.
5.) The maturity structure of loans and the tradeoff between ￿xed or variable interest rates
can very much determine the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy actions. The shorter the
maturity structure, the more immediate the pass-through from monetary policy to loan supply is
supposed to be (Ehrmann et al., 2001).
6.) Relationship lending, i.e. the phenomenon of the hausbank, may lead to loan commitments,
which could help disconnect loan supply from monetary policy to some extent (Ehrmann et al.,
2001).
7.) The government’s involvement in the banking sector either as an owner or via public guar-
antees can partially offset the effects of monetary policy on loan supply (Ehrmann et al., 2001).
8.) If loans to the private sector are denominated in foreign currency, domestic interest move-
ments have only a limited effect on the supply of and demand for loans, since their price is given
36by the foreign interest rate plus the exchange rate premium.
33 A contracting monetary policy man-
ifesting itself in higher interest rates would have an opposite effect than desired, as it would cause
an appreciation of the exchange rate, which, in turn, would lead to a shrinkage of the foreign
currency-denominated loan in domestic currency terms. The higher the share of foreign currency-
denominated loans in total lending is, the lower the direct impact of domestic monetary policy on
domestic lending and borrowing activity is.
6.5.2 Factors Interfering with the Second Stage of the Bank Lending Channel
A number of other factors in addition to trade credit and other sorts of intercompany loans can
potentially break down the second stage of the bank lending channel:
1.) A potential attenuation of both the bank lending and the broad lending channel can occur
if ￿rms are able to insulate themselves from short-term shocks in bank or external borrowing via
altering capacity utilization, if ￿nancial constraints are anticipated in advance (Wang, 2001).
2.) Government involvement may also mean soft budget constraints for ￿rms (Kornai, Maskin
and Roland, 2003). This issue may be especially important for transition economies, where the
hardening of the budget constraint may vary as a function of how advanced the privatization of
both the non￿nancial corporate and the banking sectors is and how much progress has been made
in introducing bankruptcy laws, accounting standards and Western corporate governance. In par-
ticular, soft budgets may be due to open subsidies or implicit subsidies (tolerance of tax arrears, tax
relief and tax concessions) from the government or easy access to new credits from state-owned
banks. Soft budget constraints are still present at least in some sectors of less advanced transition
countries, such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, let alone the CIS countries (see Croitoru and
Schaffer, 2002, for Romania). However, one may also argue that soft budget constraints mostly
concern larger ￿rms, which would otherwise be less subject to the credit channel.
3.) If small ￿rms’ contribution to output is low, or if only a small fraction of (small) ￿rms relies
33 Plus default risk, but this is also contained in the domestic interest rate.
37on bank lending, the macroeconomic impact of the bank lending channel will be negligible.
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4.) If the distribution of small ￿rms differs across sectors, the impact of monetary policy act-
ing via the credit channel may be heterogeneous across sectors. In particular, the share of small
￿rms in output is considerably larger in the nontradable than in the tradable sector (Tornell and
Westermann, 2002). Hence, the credit channel may be more important for the nontradable sector.
35
Ingeneral, themacro-evidenceofthebanklendingchannelinindustrializedeconomiesseemsto
be fairly weak. However, loans to households may be more responsive to monetary policy shocks
than corporate loans. Even so, the extent to which those changes matter for household consumption
remainscontroversial. Theuseofmicrobankand￿rm-leveldatasuggeststhatbanklendingactivity
may be affected by monetary policy. However, there is no consensus on which characteristics of
banks (size, liquidity, capitalization) matter most. The second stage of the bank lending channel
appears to be more debated, as some authors point out the existence of a broad lending channel
instead of a bank lending channel. In addition, trade credit seems to be an important source of
external ￿nancing for ￿rms with no credit rating.
6.6 Empirical Evidence for CEE
6.6.1 Evidence from VAR
The body of empirical literature focusing on CEE is quite specialized in the sense that most studies
concentrate on the ￿rst stage of the bank lending channel and only a few make use of the VAR
approach. Hence, a number of possibilities still await exploitation. Let us ￿rst consider the small
amount of evidence generated by VAR models. For Poland, Wr￿bel (2001) shows that a shock
in short-term interest rates causes real credit to drop in the short run and to stabilize at a lower
level afterward. Creel and Levasseur (2005) ￿nd that after the initial decrease, credit recovers for
Poland. For the Czech Republic and Hungary, the results indicate a short-term rise, rather than a
34 The capitalization and liquidity position of the ￿rms are also important for the functioning of the credit channel. Although
large ￿rms may also be weakly capitalized and less liquid, small ￿rms usually are less capitalized and less liquid than large ￿rms.
35 It is interesting to note that the vast majority of empirical studies concentrate on the open sector, i.e. manufacturing. Hence, they
may miss the point.
38fall in the credit series after a monetary policy shock. Finally, HØricourt (2005) studies the impact
of a credit shock on output and prices. The general outcome is that a credit shock temporarily
increases both output and prices (for Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). For the Czech Republic,
output ￿rst falls and then recovers. For Estonia, the results for prices depend on whether GDP or
industrial production is used. However, special care should be taken with these results because
in some cases, the impulse response functions (IRFs) look unusual, i.e. they exhibit a cyclical
￿uctuation around zero, which is dif￿cult to explain. The second cautionary note applying to all
three studies is that the vast majority of IRFs are not signi￿cantly different from zero when taking
account of the con￿dence intervals.
6.6.2 Evidence from Bank-Level Data
Turning to the micro data-based evidence, this strand of the literature uses a variant of the approach
taken in Ehrmann et al. (2001), which, in turn, is an improvement of Kashyap and Stein (2000):
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where ￿Lit is the loan supply growth rate for bank i for period t, M measures monetary policy,
Y is real output and C denotes bank characteristics. Note that equation (5) is usually estimated
separately for different bank characteristics ( C). That is, a separate regression is run, for instance,
for size, liquidity, capitalization and ownership structure. HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2005)
extend this list with the average cost of funds. Note, however, that a number of authors also
simultaneouslyincludeallbank-speci￿ccharacteristics(e.g. HavrylchykandJurzyk, 2005; K￿hler,
Hommel and Grote, 2005; Schmitz, 2004) or only two at the same time (HorvÆth, Krek￿ and
Nasz￿di, 2005).
Overall, the empirical results strongly support the view that banks react differently to monetary
39policy changes depending on the above-listed characteristics. However, the bank-level character-
istics are not equally important. For instance, Juks (2004) ￿nds that the supply of household and
corporate loans turn out to be most affected for banks with a low level of liquidity, while bank size
and capitalization does not matter. Merging data on aggregate loans for the three Baltic countries,
K￿hler, Hommel and Grote (2005) and Matousek and Sarantis (2006) come to a similar conclusion,
although Matousek and Sarantis (2006) also ￿nd size to be an important factor. Bank capitaliza-
tion may not matter for two reasons. First, capitalization measured at the bank level may not be
an appropriate measure. Instead, the capitalization of an entire bank holding should be considered.
Second, as also noted by Ehrmann et al. (2001), bank capitalization is high enough not to be af-
fected by changes in monetary conditions. A ￿nal ￿nding is that none of the three characteristics
(size, liquidity and capitalization) are correlated with corporate loan supply in a robust manner.
In a similar vein, Schmitz (2004) shows for a set of CEE countries that size and the liquidity po-
sition seem to matter and that foreign-owned banks have a more pronounced reaction to a change in
domestic and foreign monetary conditions than their domestic counterparts do. However, pooling
all countries may mask considerable cross-country heterogeneities, as country-speci￿c studies sug-
gest. An excellent example is Matousek and Sarantis (2006), who cover the CEE-5 plus the three
Baltic countries to show substantial country differences. In addition to the heterogeneity prevailing
across countries, sometimes the results are quite colorful even for the very same country. Poland is
a case in point. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005) ￿nd that the better liquidity position enables banks
to insulate loans from monetary policy actions. Weak evidence is also found for the size of the
banks. However, the estimated coef￿cient indicates that smaller banks are in a better position to
shield themselves from monetary policy. Finally, bank capitalization turns out to play no role in
the lending behavior of banks. This stands in strong contrast with Wr￿bel and Pawlowska (2002),
who ￿nd that size and capitalization explain bank lending behavior in the face of a monetary policy
move in a standard manner (larger and more capitalized banks react less), while more liquid banks
are more responsive to an increase in the policy rate than less liquid banks. This counterintuitive
40￿nding can be explained, according to the authors, by the overliquidity of the Polish banking sec-
tor. The most robust variable in the regressions run by Chmielewski (2005) and by Matousek and
Sarantis (2006) is capitalization, which indicates that better capitalized banks are shielded from the
effects of monetary policy. Foreign involvement generally turns out to result in more responsive-
ness to monetary policy. The results for liquidity are in conformity with the ￿ndings in Wr￿bel and
Pawlowska (2002). Finally, it deserves to be mentioned that the effect of bad loans may have op-
posite signs across different speci￿cations, and, importantly, foreign currency-denominated loans,
especially to households, are very insensitive to monetary policy actions.
For the Czech Republic, Matousek and Sarintis (2006) ￿nd that size, capitalization and liquidity
are important from 1994 to 2003, whereas Pruteanu (2004) comes to the conclusion that better
capitalized and more liquid banks appear to be less responsive to monetary policy from 1996 to
1998 but not from 1999 to 2001. In contrast, the result that larger banks and banks with more
bad loans in their portfolio care less about monetary policy can lead back to the existence of a
soft budget constraint mainly because of the unaccomplished privatization of the banking sector.
In addition, it seems that size is especially important for foreign banks for which the coef￿cient
switches sign between the two subperiods. From 1996 to 1998, larger foreign banks were more
affected by monetary policy actions, while from 1999 to 2001, smaller foreign banks were more
responsive. Liquidity matters for foreign banks in the ￿rst subperiod, while it becomes important
for Czech banks and foreign branches in the second subperiod.
For Hungary, HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2005) show that using more disaggregated loan se-
ries makes it is easier to pin down the bank lending channel and that all bank characteristics have
a role to play, although their results also reveal that some of the bank characteristics are not partic-
ularly robust. This contrasts with Matousek and Sarintis (2006), who can identify size as the only
variable explaining diverging bank lending activity as a result of monetary policy changes. Further-
more, the results reported in HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2005) indicate that foreign currency-
denominated corporate loans are very unresponsive to monetary policy actions.
41Finally, according to Golodniuk (2005), Ukrainian banks react differently to changes only as a
function of capitalization but not as a function of size and liquidity.
42Table 3 Results of the Empirical Literature on CEE
Author Country Type of assets Size Liq Cap Bad Own
Schmitz (2004) CEE-5 + B3 Total loans Yes Yes ￿ Yes
Pruteanu (2004) Czech Rep. Total loans Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Czech Rep. Total loans Yes Yes Yes ￿ ￿
K￿hler et al. (2005) B3, pooled Total loans Yes ￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
B3, pooled Total loans Yes Yes ￿ ￿
Juks (2004) Estonia
Bank deposits
HH loans
COR loans
Yes
?
Yes
?
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
HorvÆth et al. (2005) Hungary
COR, HH loans
FX COR loans
Yes Yes Yes
￿
￿
Yes
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Hungary Total loans Yes ￿ ￿
Chmielewski (2005) Poland
HH loans ￿ DC
HH loans ￿ FX
COR loans ￿ DC
COR loans ￿ FX
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Havrylchyk and
Jurzyk (2005)
Poland
Total loans
Deposits
? Yes
￿
￿
￿
￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Poland Total loans Yes ￿ ￿
Wr￿bel and
Pawloska (2002)
Poland Total loans Yes Yes ￿ ￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Slovakia Total loans ? ? ? ￿ ￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Slovenia Total loans ? ? ? ￿ ￿
Golodniuk (2005) Ukraine
Total loans
Consumer loans
Yes
Yes
￿
￿
￿
￿
Note: ? indicates weak evidence in favor of the given variable. HH and COR stand for households and the non￿nancial corporate sector. DC
stands for loans denominated in domestic currency, FX for those in foreign currency. CEE-5 stands for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia; B3 stands for the three Baltic countries. ￿ indicates that the given variable is not included in the study Liq, Cap, Bad
and Own are liquidity, capitalization bad loans and ownership
436.7 Some Criticism
A number of critical remarks about the literature aimed at studying the credit channel in CEE are
in order. The literature is still very scarce and deals with selected aspects of the credit channel. No
attempthasbeenmadesofartosystematicallyinvestigatehowinterestratesaffectcreditaggregates
and how changes incredit aggregates in￿uence output and prices. This is particularly true of micro-
based panel studies, which have yet to analyze the second stage of the bank lending channel. As
we know, even though bank lending behavior is in￿uenced by monetary policy steps, for the bank
lending channel to be operational, ￿rms must be found to rely solely on bank loans.
Chmielewski (2005) provides a good example in looking at loan series split into domestic and
foreign currency denominations and into corporate and household loans. Perhaps a little more
disaggregation into different segments of the corporate and household market (short-term, long-
term, consumer, housing and automobile credit) would help us understand better how, if at all, the
credit channel works in CEE. A remaining future challenge is to obtain estimates from bank- and
￿rm-level datasets of the adjustment in output and prices in the aftermath of a change in monetary
policy.
But perhaps the most important shortcoming of the literature relating to the credit channel in
general is that it assumes that credit markets are in equilibrium and that the credit series used for
estimations re￿ect this equilibrium. However, disequilibrium in the credit market may have im-
portant implications for monetary policy. If there is excess demand for credit, banks tend to ration
credit and may thus amplify (attenuate) the effect of a monetary policy tightening (loosening). In
contrast, if the supply of credit exceeds the demand for credit, perhaps because banks hold too
much liquidity, banks will not pass changes in the policy rate through to their retail rates in the
event of a monetary policy tightening,
36 because this would reduce the demand for credit, which
is already insuf￿cient to clear the market. Nonetheless, an interest rate cut would be very quickly
incorporated into loan rates (Hurlin and Kierzenkowski, 2002, 2003). Hurlin and Kierzekowski
36 This connection shows how the state of the credit market in￿uences the interest rate pass-through.
44(2003) identify excess credit supply until mid-1999 and a regime of excess demand for credit in
Poland and argue that the existence of these two regimes may explain why Polish monetary policy
became much more ef￿cient after 1999.
7 Systematic and Shock Effects of Monetary Policy
The literature reviewed thus far relates to the systematic effects of monetary policy actions on in-
￿ation and the real economy. However, VAR studies provide a (black-box) framework in which
the impact of monetary policy shocks on prices, output and macroeconomic variables can be quan-
ti￿ed. This section summarizes the main issues of this literature, namely the prize puzzle, and then
presents the empirical ￿ndings for the CEEs.
7.1 The Price Puzzle I
A huge amount of effort has been devoted to uncovering the impact of an unexpected monetary
policy shock on output and in￿ation. This literature has produced the so-called ￿price puzzle,￿ ac-
cording to which a monetary policy contraction causes a rise in the in￿ation rate rather than a drop.
While some authors quali￿ed only the response of prices nonsensical and went on interpreting the
reaction of the other variables to the shock, the vast majority of researchers have argued that the
price puzzle invalidates all the other responses as well. In this spirit, several suggestions have been
proposed to deal with this problem.
37
A ￿rst group of papers, including that of Sims (1992), claimed that the forward-looking compo-
nent of the monetary policy shock might have been misidenti￿ed, and the inclusion of commodity
prices in the system makes the puzzle disappear. The underlying idea of this line of thinking is
that policymakers in central banks also look at variables that are disregarded by academic studies
and that help forecast in￿ation. Yet VAR models extended in this manner usually include only up
37 A more fundamental criticism of the VAR literature formulated by Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) and McCallum (1999)
is that VAR models capture only unanticipated changes in monetary policy rather that the systematic relationships that con-
nect monetary policy instruments and the economy. Accounting for long-run relations is all the more import, as the unex-
pected component of monetary policy represents only a small fraction of changes in monetary policy (McCallum, 1999).
45to eight or ten variables, which represent only a small proportion of the information set available
to policymakers. The combination of factor analysis with VAR models, which gives rise to factor-
augmented VARs (FAVARs), provides a remedy to this problem. In such a setting, a small number
of factors (principal components) summarizes the information extracted from a large number (per-
haps over 100) of time series (Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, 2005).
However, Giordani (2004) and Hanson (2004) argue that variables good at predicting in￿ation
(such as accurate in￿ation forecasts) are not helpful in solving the price puzzle. Giordani (2004)
emphasizes the need to use the output gap as a remedy for the puzzle. Indeed, commodity prices
may help to mitigate the puzzle only because they are correlated with the U.S. business cycle.
Hanson (2004) shows that the price puzzle is due to the fact that the estimated VAR models cover
periods during which there is a change in the monetary policy rule. Once the period is carefully
hand-picked to remove overlaps between different monetary policy rules, the price puzzle disap-
pears.
Another strand of the literature, initiated by Barth and Ramey (2000), takes the position that
the price puzzle is not generated by methodological problems. Instead, prices tend to rise in the
wake of a monetary policy tightening because an increase in interest rates gives rise to higher
production costs re￿ected in higher in￿ation rates. They ￿nd that the so-called cost channel was
more important during the 1960s and 1970s and then declined during the 1980s and the 1990s in
the U.S. economy.
38 For small open economies, the price puzzle is likely to arise if the nominal
exchange rate is not included in the VAR (Kim and Roubini, 2000).
7.2 Price Puzzle II
In the meantime, a price puzzle seems to be taking shape for emerging market economies. In these
countries, a monetary restriction causes a rise in in￿ation if public debt is high. According to this
view, a monetary policy tightening re￿ected in higher real interest rates increases the probability
38 As they put it, unexpected monetary policy shocks can be best viewed as a combination of cost (supply) shocks and demand
shocks.
46that the government will default as a consequence of higher interest payments. Hence, the risk
premium rises, pushing foreign capital to leave the country, which, in turn, causes the exchange
rate to depreciate. If the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices is high enough, such a
depreciation leads to rising in￿ation (Blanchard, 2004, and Favero and Giavazzi, 2004).
39;40
7.3 The Exchange Rate Puzzle
Mojon and Peersman (2001) detect an exchange rate depreciation in the aftermath of a monetary
policy innovation for Italy and Spain, which had trouble defending their exchange rate in 1993.
This so-called exchange rate puzzle can be traced back to the fact that monetary policy reacted
with an increase in short-term interest rates, mostly in vain. This also helps explain the price
puzzle because nominal exchange rate depreciation feeds into domestic in￿ation (exchange rate
pass-through). Nonetheless, if monetary policy shocks are in fact a response to changes in the
exchange rate, then the issue at hand is the misidenti￿cation of monetary policy shocks, leading to
a basic dismissal of the results.
7.4 Empirical Findings for CEE
Heterogeneity in results is an accompanying phenomenon of the ever growing number of VAR
studies with a focus on CEE. According to table 4, which reports the main conclusions of the
individual papers, all kinds of results can be found for a given country. In this sense, the price
puzzle, a permanent decline or a temporary fall in the in￿ation rate after a monetary policy con-
traction can be obtained for the same country. Also, output may increase, decline permanently
or exhibit a humped shape following a monetary policy shock. However, it turns out that studies
that cover the entire transition period
41 starting in the early 1990s and that rely on recursive VAR
39 Recall that Burstein et al. (2002, 2004) show that the in￿ationary effect of a large devaluation will be limited because of
the distribution-related component of goods sold to the consumers and because of the switch from imported goods to domestic
substitutes.
40 The price puzzle was developed in the context of Brazil. It also applies to the case of other large emerging markets such
as Turkey (Aktas et al., 2005).
41 Quitesurprisingisthefactthat EuropeanForecastingNetwork (2004)estimatesaVARforHungaryforaperiodstartingin1985.
Obviously, itisdif￿culttoobtainmeaningfulresultswhenaperiodcoverstheendofcentralplanning, theearlyand the laterstagesof
47models (European Forecasting Network, 2004; Creel and Levasseur, 2005; HØricourt, 2005) tend
to obtain a price puzzle. In contrast, papers allowing for changes in the parameter estimates either
by splitting the whole sample into subsamples (Arnostova and Hurn￿k, 2004; VonnÆk, 2005), by
relying on genuine time-varying coef￿cient estimates (Darvas, 2005) or by employing a more so-
phisticated and hence more precise identi￿cation scheme of monetary policy innovation (VonnÆk,
2005; Jaroci· nski, 2005). The price puzzle in the Czech Republic may be due to the emergence of
the exchange rate puzzle during the 1997 period (Arnostova and Hurn￿k, 2004). Jaroci· nski (2005)
compares the mean of the impulse response functions of four CEE economies (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) to that of ￿ve euro area countries (Finland, France, Germany, Italy and
Spain) and ￿nds that the reaction of prices and output to monetary policy shocks is stronger in CEE
than in the euro area.
In sum, as put forth by Elbourne and de Haan (2004) for industrialized countries, the main
sources of cross-study heterogeneity in results are (1) the different time period, (2) the use of dif-
ferent schemes to identify monetary policy shocks, and (3) the use of a different set of variables.
42
the transition process.
42 HØricourt (2005) also argues that it does matter whether one employs industrial production or GDP ￿gures for output.
48Table 4 Summary of VAR Results
Author Results
Arnostova and
Hurn￿k (2004)
CZ, full period: foreign exchange and price puzzle, output: U-shaped
1998, price and output: U-shaped, no foreign exchange puzzle
Bitans et al. (2003) LV, prices: slow decrease and then slow recovery
Creel and
Levasseur (2005)
In￿ation: price puzzle for all countries
Output increases for 1999 to 2004, no reaction for HU
Darvas (2005)
Price puzzle in CZ (1998, 2004), HU (1994, 1998), drop in prices in PL
Output: drops most in PL, least in HU, but recovers more quickly in PL
than in HU; Response pro￿les change over time
EFN (2004)
Mostly not signi￿cant (EE, SI, LT)
In￿ation: CZ price puzzle, HU, LV U-shaped, SK permanent decrease (Q),
U-shaped (M), PL no signi￿cant change (Q, M)
Output: CZ, HU U-shaped; PL strong drop then recovery (M),
SK permanent increase
Elbourne and
de Haan (2006)
CEE-10; in￿ation: largest and quickest drop in SK and RO; PL,
CZ protracted, others small;HU: price puzzle
Output: large and quick drop; CZ mostly quick; SK and EE slow
Ganev et al. (2002)
In￿ation: SI, CZ permanent rise, LV, SK temporary fall, HU permanent fall
Output: decrease is fastest in HU, more permanent in CZ, decreases and
adjustment in SK and SI, increases in the remaining countries;
BG, RO: large ￿uctuations
HØricourt (2005)
In￿ation: CZ, price and fforeign exchange puzzle; HU, SI price puzzle
Output: CZ, GDP and IIP different
EE, PL, SK: no signi￿cant change
Jaroci· nski (2005) CEE-4: decline in output and prices
Kuijs (2001
M2 shock: SK, increase in in￿ation (unit labor cost increase),
little impact on output.
Maliszewski (1999)
In￿ation: PL declines and recovers partially
Output: PL declines and recovers partially (more strongly than in￿ation)
Maliszewski (2002)
In￿ation: CZ, PL slow decline and stabilization at lower level
Output: CZ, PL hump-shaped, but not full recovery
VonnÆk (2005)
HU: 1992 to 2003 price puzzle
HU: 1995 to 2003 quick decline in output, slow decline in prices,
currency appreciation
Wr￿bel (2001)
Prices: PL increase followed by decrease and slight recovery, but still negative
Output: PL increase followed by decrease and full recovery
Credit: PL large decrease followed by slow recovery
Note:CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SI denote the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The CEE-10 includes these countries and Bulgaria. The CEE-4 covers CZ, HU, PL and SI. Q and M refer to quarterly and monthly frequencies.
498 Concluding Remarks
The determinants of the different channels of the transmission mechanism set out in the paper
may give us some clues about the past and possibly about the future development of the different
channels. Starting with the very ￿rst step of the transmission mechanism, the interest rate pass-
through improved substantially from the beginning of transition until the present, both in terms of
thespeedofadjustmenttowardlong-termpassthroughandofthesizeofthelong-runpass-through,
mostly because of the development of the ￿nancial and banking sectors in these countries.
Speculating about the future from a macro-perspective, money market volatility is bound to fall
to euro area levels after euro adoption, and ￿nancial depth is likely to rise in the years to come.
At the same time, in￿ation rates will close the gap to the in￿ation rate of the euro area, and long-
run GDP growth may slow down as real convergence progresses. The ￿rst two factors will work
toward an increase in the pass-through while the next two variables could dampen it. Looking at
the structure of the banking sector, e.g. Poland, Slovenia and Latvia have fewer foreign investors,
partly because of slower banking sector reform. Poland and Slovenia are the countries with the
highest burden of nonperforming loans, and Slovenia has the lowest capital adequacy ratio, which
is still comparable to that of the euro area, however. All this is admittedly detrimental to the pass-
through. So, by making efforts on the front of banking reforms, these countries would be able
to enhance the interest rate pass-through. However, market concentration has recently been on
the rise in most of these countries. Very high concentration rates can be observed in Estonia and
Lithuania, while concentration is lowest in Hungary and Poland. Generally, market concentration
is higher than in the euro area and is still on the rise, indicating to our minds that the interest rate
pass-through may slow down and become less complete in the future in these countries.
Let us now turn to the issue of the exchange rate pass-through. Although trade and import
exposure rose sharply in all countries except for Slovenia, the exchange rate pass-through has
decreased over time and is expected to be stabilizing at a lower level. The main reason for this
decrease is the steady fall in in￿ation rates to very low levels in all countries, perhaps with the
50exception of Romania and Russia, and the abandonment of accommodative monetary policies. The
composition effect, measured as an increase in the share of manufactured goods in total imports,
is fairly substantial in all countries, with the exception of Slovenia. However, its role is not clear-
cut, given that the pass-through for this group of goods is found to be higher on occasion than for
more homogeneous goods. Even so, and because of an expected decline in relatively high in￿ation
volatility and exchange rate volatility, the exchange rate channel will lose its prominent role in the
monetary transmission mechanism, if it has not done so already. However, changes in the exchange
rate may have a strong impact on the balance sheet of ￿rms and households, if there is a currency
mismatch between revenues and expenditures. Currency mismatch may be an issue because of the
recentsurgeinforeigncurrency-denominatedhouseholdloansand, toalesserextent, inloanstothe
corporate sector. After euro adoption, the effect of the pass-through will come directly from trade
with countries outside the euro area, and indirectly via the direct impact of the major currencies’
￿uctuations against the euro (EUR/JPY, EUR/GBP and EUR/USD) on the main euro area trading
partners, such as Germany, France and Italy.
The asset price channel is still of limited importance and is probably going to remain a low-
pro￿le transmission channel. Stock and bond markets matter little to investment and consumption
decisions through the wealth and income effects, given that these markets are dominated massively
by foreign investors rather than by domestic ones. As a consequence, price movements on these
markets have a limited impact on the domestic economy via these two effects. Even though the
effect of monetary policy via the property market does not appear to be very important for the
time being, this channel may grow more powerful in the future with the dynamic development of
borrowing related to housing.
The limited role of the capital market manifests itself not only for the asset price channel, but
has also important implications for the credit channel. Obviously, new funds raised on both stock
and bond markets are virtually close to zero in CEE, as only a very limited number of companies
get listed on the stock market and as bond markets are used for ￿nancing public debt. This is
51unlikely to change in the near future. As a consequence, one may think that the ￿nancing of the
non￿nancial corporate sector transits through the banking sector.
Nonetheless, there are several factors that may weaken the credit channel. First, the high con-
centration of the banking sectors, the heavy involvement of foreigners, the high degree of liquidity
and more than suf￿cient levels of bank capitalization render banks less responsive to domestic
monetary policy impulses. Second, notwithstanding the absence of well functioning capital mar-
kets, ￿rms may escape from domestic credit markets either by borrowing in foreign currency or by
relying on trade credit and other kinds of inter￿rm loans relating to transnational networks created
by FDI.
The moderately good news for the effectiveness of monetary policy is, however, that ￿rms
capable of escaping domestic monetary policy conditions are strongly in￿uenced by monetary
policy in the euro area either because foreign currency loans are denominated in euro, or because
their parent institutions are themselves subjected to the credit channel in the euro area.
When looking at the recipient sectors and the distribution of small and large ￿rms across sec-
tors, it appears that the manufacturing sector is less subject to the credit channel than the rest of
the economy, in particular the service sector. First, FDI in￿ows to manufacturing were dispropor-
tionately high. Second, small ￿rms are mostly concentrated in nontradables. Argued the other way
around, the credit channel is likely to be operational for the market-based nontradable sector and
may have a strong impact on this part of the economy. Even though services account for about
70% of GDP in most countries, the country-speci￿c impact is heterogeneous depending on how
large the contribution of small ￿rms to GDP is and how large public involvement in nontradable
sectors is.
In addition, households mainly rely on bank borrowing.
43 We will witness the emergence and
a subsequent strengthening of the credit channel for households with a buildup in the stock of
household loans. However, monetary policy will affect this segment of the economy only partially
43 Note, however, that in the mortgage market there is fast-growing activity by nonbanking ￿nancial institutions.
52and relatively slowly, given that the interest rate pass-through is lowest and most sluggish for
consumer loans. As we argued earlier, the interest rate pass-through may slow down in the course
of the coming years. This may indeed further cushion the impact of monetary policy through the
credit channel.
Finally, while the credit channel is likely to be at work or to gain importance in the nontrad-
able sector and in the household sector, the interest rate channel may have a larger impact on the
manufacturing sector. The ￿nal impact of monetary policy on output and prices of the manufac-
turing sector depends crucially on how parts of manufacturing react to changes in the interest rate.
Although the share of manufacturing is fairly stable at around 20% for all countries under study,
its composition differs substantially from country to country. For instance, food production plays
an important role in Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, while the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia excel in producing electrical, optical and transport equipment. To the extent that these
sectors differ in terms of markup (high or low markup sectors), they may have different reactions in
different channels, as we set out above. Hence, a heterogeneous response of these sectors to mon-
etary policy innovations may generate substantial cross-country heterogeneity to monetary policy
impulses.
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